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Vote Buying and Tax- cCut Promises 
Thom Brooks 
 
Abstract: Both vote buying and tax- cut promises are attempts to manipulate voters through 
cash incentives in order to win elections, but only vote buying is illegal. Should we extend 
the ban on vote buying to tax- cut promises? This article will argue for three conclusions. The 
first is that tax- cut promises should be understood as a form of vote buying. The second is 
that campaign promises are a form of vote buying. The third conclusion is that campaign 
promises, including tax- cut promises, should not be banned. An important distinction is 
drawn between enforceable wrongful incentives and unenforceable wrongful incentives. The 
difference between vote buying and tax- cut promises is not wrongfulness, but enforceability.  
Keywords: bribery, campaign promises, democracy, election fraud, tax- cut promises, voting 
 
I 
Consider the following two cases:  
 
Vote- buying case. Adam is running for political office and he wants to win election. 
He offers cash to voters as an incentive for voters to vote for him. 
 
Tax- cut promises case. Eve is running for political office and she wants to win 
election. She offers promises of tax cuts to voters as an incentive for voters to vote for 
her. 
 
Both cases feature attempts to manipulate voters through cash incentives in order to win 
elections, but only vote buying is illegal.
1
 Should we extend the ban on vote buying to tax- 
cut promises? 
 This article will argue for three conclusions. The first is that tax- cut promises should 
be understood as a form of vote buying— – and this is problematic insofar as it involves the 
wrongful manipulation of voters. The wrongfulness consists in manipulating voters to subvert 
justice for the sake of private monetary gain. Both are cases where candidates for elected 
office offer money to voters to gain their support in an election. It is argued that 
notwithstanding differences between them, each is a form of voter manipulation offering cash 
for votes.  
 The second conclusion expands the discussion from tax- cut promises to include 
campaign promises, such as to deliver certain benefits to a particular group or class of voters. 
It is claimed that they too can embody a form of vote buying and so can be similarly 
problematic. The third conclusion is that campaign promises, including tax- cut promises, 
should nevertheless not be banned. An important distinction is drawn between enforceable 
and unenforceable wrongful incentives. The difference between vote buying and tax- cut 
promises is not wrongfulness, but enforceability. There are limits to how far we can constrain 
the kinds of incentives candidates for elected office might offer voters, including where these 
include wrongful manipulation. 
 
II 
We begin with the distinction between bribery and vote buying: vote buying has been 
described as ‘bribing’ the electorate, for example.2 Bribery is often defined as the offer or 
acceptance of something of value in exchange for wrongful influence on a public official.
3
 
We are said to bribe a public official where we offer money for a planning permit that we 
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would not otherwise receive. The inducement of a bribe might influence a public official to 
perform his official role differently than if no such bribe was offered. Such influence might 
lead to a public official failing to fulfil a public duty to enforce regulations impartially (see 
Carson 1985: 81).  
 Now consider bribery in relation to electoral fraud. Bribery is where members of the 
public attempt to influence public officials wrongly. Public officials engage in electoral fraud 
where they attempt to influence the public wrongly. Electoral fraud may take many forms, 
including vote buying. Electoral fraud may take many forms beyond vote buying, such as 
damaging ballots. Damaging ballots would be one attempt to manipulate an election result, 
but it may be different from the case of vote buying as cash incentives may be absent. This 
article will focus specifically on vote buying as one form of electoral fraud that bears 
important resemblances with bribery and tax- cut promises. 
 Bribes occur when people try to buy the influence of officials. Vote buying occurs 
when a political candidate triesy to buy the votes of the public.
4
 For example, Robert Dahl 
(1959: 69) has argued that ‘[i]n a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is 
bribery of the electorate by the politicians’. Bribery and vote buying share a similar structure: 
I intend to provide you with some benefit in return for a potentially unfair influence that may 
pervert public justice, such as an election result (Dal Bo 2007). Influencing election results 
through bribery or vote buying may often lead to unfairness, but perhaps not in every case. If 
bribing is sufficiently widespread, then it may not be unfair to bribe where doing so might 
contribute to having a minimum of political influence and failing to do so would lead to my 
having none.  
 The central idea is that the object of this benefit— – understood as the person to 
receive something of value— – might not have shown the same favour if no such benefit 
were offered. The benefit offered is linked with an attempt to incentivisze individuals to vote 
for a particular candidate. This situation is different from attempts to incentivisze individuals 
to vote by offering to compensate every voter for voting because they are attempts to get 
individuals to vote and not for any particular candidate. My focus is on attempts to 
manipulate individuals to vote for a particular candidate and not for merely casting a vote in 
an election.
5
  
 Bribery is more than a potential benefit to public officials and vote buying is more 
than a potential benefit to voters: both are wrongful manipulations of others. Their 
wrongfulness consists in their being intentional manipulations of others that pervert public 
justice. A key point is that the manipulation is intended. This raises questions about the 
motivation behind this intention. Suppose Annie is a political candidate promising tax cuts to 
the electorate. There may be a difference between whether (a) her promise is motivated only 
by the intention to manipulate voters to select her for political office irrespective of other 
consequences and (b) her promise is motivated by an intention arising from a justified true 
belief (for the sake of argument) that less tax revenue may contribute to consequences for all, 
including greater employment and more government revenue to fund public services. The 
motivation behind the intention to manipulate others has importance. Note that the motivation 
behind an intention to manipulate need not be disingenuous to count as wrongful 
manipulation as a political campaigner might believe their manipulative rhetoric.  
 Examples include bribing officials for swift approval of permits and politicians 
buying votes from the public. These acts pervert public justice in unlawfully manipulating 
permit approval and an election result. It must be emphasised that candidates for political 
office can and do make promises to the electorate with material consequences for how voters 
respond. This is an important part about what politics is (and perhaps should be) about. The 
issue explored in this article is discovering the line, if any, between permissible attempts and 
non-permissible attempts at voter manipulation. The argument defended here is that the 
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difference between vote buying and campaign promises is enforceability and not 
wrongfulness. Bribery and vote buying are illegal and uncontroversial. 
 
III 
Bribery and vote buying share much in common. But what about vote buying and tax- cut 
promises? Politicians across ideological divisions often promise tax cuts in return for their 
election. Tax- cut promises have at least a prima facie similarity with vote buying and this 
similarity appears in the cases of Adam and Eve in section I. A political candidate engages in 
vote buying if she offers cash for votes. This act of electoral fraud gives an incentive to 
members of the public to pervert public justice and alter the outcome of an election through 
manipulation.  
 An analogous situation may arise with tax- cut promises. When political candidates 
engage in tax- cut promises, they are also offering cash for votes in the hopes of manipulating 
the result of an election in their favour. Political candidates act on the intention to manipulate 
voters through the promise of future rewards when engaged in vote buying and tax- cut 
promises. Both promise benefits in exchange for votes and the benefits are monetary. Vote 
buying and tax- cut promises share much in common (Dekel et al. 2008: 352).
6
  
 The claim that each is a form of manipulation is not to deny voter agency or 
independence of mind: voters may not respond to manipulation attempts in the ways 
manipulators anticipate. Instead, the claim that vote buying and tax- cut promises share much 
in common as forms of wrongful manipulation is to claim they can affect the autonomous 
decisions by voters in elections.  
 Such cases can be difficult to identify – and this renders enforceability very difficult. 
Two people who are similarly situated in all relevant respects may respond to the same 
incentives differently.
7
 One might respond positively to a tax- cut promise because of pre-
existing ideological commitments. Another might respond likewise be motivated purely by 
the promise of a cash return for his vote. It is not clear in any intuitive sense that the first 
voter is manipulated in a wrongful way: that voter reacts to the incentive from an established 
position. The second voter does appear manipulated in a wrongful way insofar as the primary 
motivation for voting one way or another is the promise of a cash reward to that person – he 
perceives the incentive as a cash for votes and votes accordingly in the hope of receiving a 
monetary reward without much concern for other factors. 
 
IV 
Vote buying and tax- cut promises share much in common, but there are important 
differences. The first difference is that only vote buying is illegal, although this has not 
always been the case historically. This article is considering whether this ban on vote buying 
should be extended to tax- cut promises and our conclusion cannot be determined at this point. 
 There are other important differences. Consider the case of vote buying: 
 
Vote- buying case. Adam is running for political office and he wants to win election. 
He offers cash to voters as an incentive for voters to vote for him. 
 
Adam is running for political office and he wants to win the election. His offer of cash to 
potential voters is not meant merely to win over more votes, but win the election. This 
distinction is important to the analysis: Adam buys votes to manipulate public justice in terms 
of influencing who is selected as the winning candidate. This is different than a candidate 
uninterested in winning an election, but who attempts to buy votes for other purposes, such as 
pride or satisfying his ego. Adam offers an incentive to voters to vote for his election in the 
form of cash. This incentive may lead some to vote for him who might not have done so 
without this incentive.  
 The key features of vote buying include its being offered in secret and paid upfront to 
potential voters.
8
 Adam will not offer to buy votes in public, but in secret. This is because 
vote buying is illegal and Adam attempts to buy votes in order to win election: if he is 
discovered vote buying votes, this act of electoral fraud will disqualify him from the election. 
One contingent difference is that vote buying will be conducted in secret to avoid detection 
by election officials. Furthermore, Adam will offer to buy votes upfront. This is because he 
cannot buy votes post-election, but instead pre-election. The idea is to manipulate the election 
result and not post-election results. Vote buying will be conducted in secret and paid upfront 
to voters. Only potential supporters may receive this incentive. 
 Now consider the case of tax- cut promises: 
 
Tax- cut promises case. Eve is running for political office and she wants to win 
election. She offers promises of tax cuts to voters as an incentive for voters to vote for 
her. 
 
Tax- cut promises are declared in public. Eve may have little reason to keep such a promise 
secret. She will want her promise known to potential voters, but may also want to limit 
knowledge of the promise beyond her constituents if highly unpopular with the public. Eve 
wants to win election and hopes this incentive may help her win the election. Tax- cut 
promises are not illegal and so their public declaration will not lead to her becoming 
disqualified from running for office. Tax- cut promises are different from vote buying 
because the former is conducted in public and the latter is not. This difference is because of 
the illegality of vote buying. If we believe the ban on vote buying should be extended to tax- 
cut promises, then tax- cut promises would also be offered in secret and this difference might 
disappear. 
 While Eve promises tax cuts to voters during her election campaign, she cannot 
deliver tax cuts upfront. Instead, she may only deliver on her promise to cut taxes post-
election if she wins. Tax- cut promises can only take effect after an election is won and the 
benefits are shared by supporters and non-supporters alike. Eve may only promise benefits to 
potential supporters in the form of tax cuts post-election. Her promise is conditional on 
winning the election and her ability to pass this legislation.
9
 She cannot guarantee tax cuts 
upfront before the election result is known.  
 Tax- cut promises differ from vote buying as the latter can be guaranteed up front and 
paid to supporters before an election. Tax- cut promises are not guaranteed and they are not 
limited to supporters alone: voters may benefit from tax cuts whether or not they voted for 
Eve.
10
 While tax- cut promises may aspire to appeal to select potential voters more than 
others, this appeal cannot be guaranteed and the benefits cannot be limited to supporters 
only.
11
 
 Tax- cut promises lack the degree of certainty of vote buying. Vote buying has greater 
certainty in its being a benefit directed towards potential supporters alone and it can be paid 
in advance of an election. This signifies the conditional structure of vote buying. One form is 
payment whereby paper money is cut in half: voters receive one half prior to the election and 
the second half after the election, but only if the candidate wins. A second form is non-
monetary, such as providing one shoe prior to an election and the rest of the pair afterwards.  
 Tax- cut promises are more conditional. Their benefit is conditional upon election 
success and legislative success whereas vote buying need not. Note the argument is not that 
vote buying lacks a conditional structure, but that it need not be conditional on electoral 
success. Tax- cut promises are different because they are conditional on electoral success. 
Tax cuts may not benefit all supporters and they may benefit many non-supporters. Vote 
buying are benefits that can be directed more easily to supporters alone in advance.  
 It might be objected that the most important difference is that vote buying is where a 
candidate uses his or her own money to influence voter choice versus tax- cut promises 
whereby a candidate advocates returning some share of the voters’ pre-tax money: so it is a 
difference between a candidate giving out money to voters or taking less of the voters’ own 
money.
12
 But this distinction can run into difficulties. Vote buying need not involve any of 
the candidate’s personal resources. Others, such as wealthy special interests supporting his or 
her campaign, could supply the resources on his behalf. Furthermore, tax- cut promises need 
not lead to voters having more of their own resources. One reason is because the tax cut 
might pertain to an expected future income not yet realised – it is not uncommon for 
working- class support in favour of lower tax burdens on the more wealthy in the hope that 
they may join them in future. But also where cuts are made in one area, they may need to be 
raised in others: cuts to public subsidy for rail fares in the U.K. led to higher prices year on 
year, for example. Cutting public funding for public services can lead to tax payers making 
the same, if not higher, costs for the services they have enjoyed. 
 Both vote buying and tax- cut promises are forms of promising, but they differ in 
terms of their certainty and inclusion. Adam may offer to buy votes upfront and directed only 
at potential voters. Eve may only promise to provide tax cuts after the election is concluded 
and dependent upon her winning office and her ability to pass a tax- cut bill. Moreover, Eve’s 
promise may benefit many of her supporters, but the benefits may not extend to all potential 
supporters and they will likely extend towards many non-supporters. Nor might Eve be able 
to know with certainty which of her claimed supporters did, in fact, vote for her in an election 
because voting takes place through a secret ballot. 
 
V 
Vote buying and tax- cut promises are forms of promising, but only tax- cut promises are 
promises that are public.
13
 Tax- cut promises are not unique in this respect: tax- cut promises 
are one form of campaign promises. Consider the case of campaign promises: 
 
Campaign- promises case. Cameron is running for political office and he wants to win 
election. He offers campaign promises to voters as an incentive for voters to vote for 
him. 
 
Political candidates offer voters incentives in the form of campaign promises. These promises 
attempt to manipulate voters to supporting their candidacy over other candidates for public 
office.
14
 Campaign promises include pledges to cut taxes, but these pledges may take other 
forms including improved public pensions or job- creation initiatives. The promises that 
Cameron might offer will be limited in many of the respects that Eve’s tax- cut promises are 
limited. Both may be declared publicly because neither is illegal, but neither can be 
guaranteed in advance and both are conditional on post-election success and implementation. 
Campaign promises are no more certain than tax- cut promises.  
 All tax- cut promises are campaign promises, but not all campaign slogans are tax- cut 
promises. Tax- cut promises offer incentives to voters in the form of monetary benefits: if 
Eve wins office, then she promises voters that they will have more money through tax cuts. 
Campaign promises offer incentives to voters that may take the form of monetary benefits 
and non-monetary benefits. If Cameron wins the election, he may promise voters that they 
will see benefits such as improved public services.  
 Campaign promises offer benefits to supporters not unlike tax- cut promises. Both are 
conditional promises of future benefits that are offered to potential voters in order to 
manipulate election results. Potential voters might choose candidates differently in the 
absence of such promises. Key differences between campaign promises and tax- cut promises 
are that tax- cut promises are a form of campaign promises and that campaign promises may 
offer non-monetary benefits. 
 Campaign promises and tax- cut promises are both conditional promises: neither 
offers any guarantee. Both promises are conditional on election victory and implementation. 
We should also note that not all promises are promoted sincerely: some promises are offered 
to supporters to manipulate their votes without any sincere commitment to make good on 
promises made. While failure to implement a campaign promise, such as a tax- cut promise, 
may be politically damaging, political support differs over time: promises that attracted much 
favour on the campaign trail may turn into potential liabilities if brought into law after an 
election victory. 
 
VI 
It is time for a few initial results. The first is that bribery, vote buying, and tax- cut promises 
are related closely. Bribes are monetary incentives the public offers to public officials to 
manipulate their decision that may threaten public justice. Vote buying is a form of electoral 
fraud whereby political candidates offer cash incentives to the public to manipulate their 
decision on how to vote that may also threaten public justice. Tax- cut promises are also cash 
incentives to the public to manipulate their decisions on elections. Tax- cut promises differ 
from vote buying in that the former are more conditional and cannot be guaranteed in 
advance to supporters-only.
15
 Campaign promises are incentives to the public to manipulate 
their decisions on elections. Campaign promises are similar to tax- cut promises in all 
respects except that the former may offer both monetary and non-monetary benefits.  
 There is a fine line between vote buying and tax- cut promises.
16
 Moreover, this fine 
line also exists between vote buying and campaign promises more generally.
17
 It is unclear 
how vote buying is more wrong than any form of campaign promising, such as tax- cut 
promises. It might be objected that the key difference between vote buying and tax- cut 
promises is that tax cuts must be passed through a set of proper procedures. Thus, it might be 
said, the promised benefits to a particular group of voters is determined in a lawfully 
established way and so the claim that vote buying is private and tax- cut promises are public 
misses this important distinction. I disagree with this objection because it assumes too much. 
The fact that tax cuts must be endorsed through agreed procedures does not make the fact 
they were promised – as an effort to manipulate voters into providing electoral support – 
normatively satisfactory.  
 Likewise, the fact that legal procedures are followed does not render those procedures 
normatively acceptable. Suppose a government passed tax cuts to its supporters following 
procedures in place prior to the election – and with the new majority it has thanks to the 
manipulation of voters into supporting the government’s new majority through tax- cut 
promises. The fact that tax cuts follow certain procedures does not render them morally 
unproblematic all things considered. So I am unpersuaded by this objection. 
 Both vote buying and tax- cut promises attempt to manipulate the public vote for 
candidates through the use of monetary incentives: voters are promised monetary benefits in 
return for their votes. Both are attempts to manipulate voters through offering incentives. 
Whether or not these attempts manipulate individual voters will depend on whether 
individuals would vote different if these attempts were not present. A key difference is that 
the promise of vote buying is more certain and limited to supporters. There is an important 
divergence between promises to cut taxes versus promises to not raise taxes. The promise to 
cut taxes is a promise to reward voters through gain. The promise not to not raise taxes 
maintains the status quo. This is not to argue that it cannot be manipulative also, but rather to 
claim it is less certain to be manipulative compared with the promise to cut taxes. 
 This difference need not lead us to conclude that vote buying is more wrong than tax- 
cut promises as an attempt to manipulate voters. Several arguments have been advanced on 
why vote buying is wrongful manipulation (see Hasen 2000: 1325–-26). One argument 
concerns equality: the poor will be more likely to sell their votes than the wealthy and this 
may lead to political outcomes that favour the wealthy over the poor. Therefore, some social 
groups may be more likely to change their vote in relation to manipulation of their choice 
because they are more financially vulnerable. They may be less able to resist attempted 
infringement of their autonomously made best judgements all things considered because of 
the vulnerability of their class rather than their actual preferences.  
 Moreover, vote buying creates an asymmetry that fosters inequality: ‘No matter how 
appealing a promised program or how gratifying an incumbent’s programmatic 
accomplishments, support flows away from those who “‘do not have money to give”’ and 
toward those who “‘have things to give away”’’ (Stokes, et. al. 2013: 247–-48). Vote buying 
creates inequalities not only between sellers, but buyers as well.  
 A second argument focuses on efficiency: vote buying undermines overall social 
wealth. Resources are diverted from where they might be needed most to best serve the 
public good to an instrument for winning power for a person or group. A third argument 
concerns inalienability: votes are the inalienable possession of voters and not alienable – and, 
thus, not for sale – by voters.18 Vote buying is wrongful manipulation because its incentives 
may lead to undermining equality and efficiency, as well as rejecting the inalienability of a 
person’s vote.19 
 It is unclear that many campaign promises do not lead to similar possibilities. 
Campaign promises are incentives for voters that often appeal to their individual well-being. 
Comment [HH1]: Do you mean 
‘unclear whether many campaign 
promises lead to…’ or ‘clear that many 
campaign promises do not lead..’? 
These promises may include more money for voters through tax cuts post-election. Indeed, 
many tax- cut promises may fail to improve equality.
20
 Similarly, vote buying is thought to 
violate the inalienability of a person’s vote. The idea is that votes are not for sale.21 The 
problem with vote buying is that it is an attempt to ‘purchase’ votes from individuals through 
monetary incentives. Likewise, a potential problem for tax- cut promises is that they may also 
offer monetary incentives for the same ends. In other words, tax- cut promises attempt to 
‘purchase’ votes through monetary incentives not unlike vote buying.22 
 Vote buying is illegal, but it is not always wrongful in any obvious sense. For 
example, the manipulation of voters to ensure a particular result on an election day may be 
the best result for the prosperity of all: the most popular candidates for office may not be the 
best able or even competent to succeed if elected. It is possible to consider the potential 
argument for vote buying where this were the only way to avoid an elected fascist 
government. Such cases may be controversial and rare, but they make clear that vote buying 
is not clearly wrong in all cases. 
 Brennan argues for a similar position, but for different reasons. He argues that citizens, 
if they choose to vote, ‘must vote well, on the basis of sound evidence for what is likely to 
promote the common good. They must make sure their reasons for voting as they do are 
morally and epistemically justified’ (Brennan 2011: 4). Call these duties the Duties to Vote 
Well. Brennan claims that ‘vote buying, selling and trading are morally permissible’ where it 
does not violate our Duties to Vote Well and so not wrongful. One problem with this 
argument is that the ‘reasons for voting’ which must be ‘morally and epistemically justified’ 
should arguably omit vote buying, selling and trading. Brennan disagrees because selling my 
vote might not violate my Duties to Vote Well where the choice supported by my Duties is 
consistent with the electoral choice my vote is paid for. This is controversial, but if accepted 
we might still raise a second problem for his argument, which is this: in this context, the 
exercise of my choice is independent of manipulation – and can I? This may be an empirical 
matter concerning whether it is possible for some, if any, citizens to sell their votes while 
exercising their choices consistently with their Duties to Vote Well, which is at the least 
unproven and doubtful. 
 Campaign promises are not obviously morally acceptable in all cases. For example, 
some promises may create or maintain structural inequalities based upon ethnicity, gender or 
sexual orientation. Campaign promises may often be understood as wrongful manipulation, 
but this is not always true. Vote buying may be illegal and often understood as wrongful 
manipulation, but it is not always true that vote buying is wrongful manipulation of voters 
across all cases.  
 So it is not clear that campaign promises would not lead to the same problematic 
results we might expect from vote buying. Both vote buying and campaign promises may 
lead to wrongful manipulation, but not necessarily in every case. Their difference is not that 
one is never a case of wrongful manipulation of voters. 
 
VII 
The difference between bribes and vote buying is that the former is where the people attempt 
to manipulate public officials through monetary incentives and the latter is where public 
officials attempt to manipulate the public through monetary incentives. Vote buying is akin to 
political candidates bribing voters to win election. Both bribery and vote buying is illegal. 
 This article has argued that the wrongness of vote buying may be attributed to its 
being a wrongful manipulation of voters through monetary incentives that may damage 
public justice by wrongfully influencing an election result.
23
 The wrongfulness of vote 
buying is not dissimilar to the potential wrongfulness of tax- cut promises or campaign 
promises more generally where a political candidate is also seeking to offer incentives in the 
form of future benefits to voters in order to influence an election result. Vote buying and 
campaign promises share much in common and in terms of their potential wrongfulness. 
 One key difference between vote buying and campaign promises has concerned 
certainty and scope. Vote buying has greater certainty because the monetary incentive is 
offered pre-election whereas campaign promises are conditional upon winning the election 
and implementation. The scope of vote buying is limited to potential supporters offered 
monetary incentives whereas campaign promises may benefit supporters and non-supporters 
alike.
24
 One reason to ban vote buying and not tax- cut promises is because tax- cut promises 
have insufficient certainty and they are not limited to supporters-only. While campaign 
promises may be directed towards specific groups in the electorate, they may be enjoyed by 
persons not in these groups at the time of an election and so not limited to supporters-only. 
Campaign promises to enact laws favoured by labour unions might apply to persons not 
presently in a union and so not limited to supporters alone. 
 The case of vote buying through offering the reward of a lottery ticket is different. 
Both vote buying through issuing a lottery ticket and tax- cut promises might possess 
insufficient certainty about potential benefits, but a key difference is that this version of vote 
buying remains limited to supporters-only and not all potential voters. This partiality towards 
supporters-only might help explain why many might claim such vote buying is illegal 
perhaps despite its insufficient certainty. 
 Tax- cut promises may often consist in a wrongful manipulation of voters, but they 
fail to satisfy a threshold above which a ban would become justified.
25
 Tax- cut promises are 
then similar to bribing the public, only not as wrongful as directly offering monetary 
incentives for votes pre-election to supporters-only.  
 There is a second key difference between vote buying and campaign promises, such 
as tax- cut promises. This difference is that banning vote buying is much easier to ban than 
tax- cut promises. Both may offer wrongful manipulations of voters in many cases. The key 
difference is the possibility of enforcingeability of any ban. Vote buying can be easily 
identified. It is easier to track payments to potential supporters because the monetary 
incentives are offered pre-election to supporters-only.
26
 This is untrue with tax- cut promises. 
These promises are presented to voters, but may not become enacted until after an election. 
Voters may select candidates with the expectation of monetary reward, but no such benefits 
are possible pre-election and their condition post-election is to be shared potentially with 
non-supporters if the candidate delivers on this campaign promise. 
 Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine political campaigns without campaign promises, 
including campaign promises to cut taxes. The public may only come to an informed decision 
on which candidates to elect if the public knows what is on offer from these candidates. If 
voters choose candidates based on the criteria that a candidate offers an individual voter the 
most benefits, then such a voter is effectively selling his vote to the highest bidder. This is a 
case where the line between vote buying and campaign promises is thin. If voters choose 
candidates for their political community based on the criteria that a candidate offers the 
political community the best outcomes, then such a voter is not selling his vote to the highest 
bidder. Her vote is not for sale. 
 This view of the voter has a clear tradition in democratic thought, including Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s argument that we should be bound by the general will, rather than mere 
private interest: ‘[n]othing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on public 
affairs’ (1997: 91).27 Moreover, Rousseau argues that ‘[t]he better constituted the State, the 
more public business takes precedence over private business in the minds of Citizens’ (1997: 
113). It is essential to good government that voters make decisions based upon the good of all. 
However, many voters will make decisions based upon their private, short-term interests 
instead— – and which may undermine their well-being in future. The promise of an 
immediate reward can outweigh its long-term greater costs. The problem is that we could not 
easily ban votes from citizens who decide their voting preferences for the wrong reasons.
28
  
 Rousseau may be correct to warn that some voters may threaten public justice by 
prioritising private interest over the common good, but this could never be enforced. The only 
protection the public has against tax- cut promises serving as vote buying is itself.
29
 The 
primary difference between vote buying and campaign promises is not that one is always 
more wrong than the other, but that both may be wrongful and only one may be wrongful and 
enforceable. This is why vote buying should be banned and not tax- cut promises.
30
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Notes 
                                                 
1. For example, see 18 U.S.C. §597 (1999) and Hasen (2000). 
2. See Dal Bo (2007); Heckelman (1998); Lockwood, Philippopoulos  et al.and Snell (1994). 
3. This definition is commonplace, but there are other definitions relating to bribery and 
business ethics. See Carson (1985: 70–-71, 81); D’Andrade (1985: 239); and Philips (1984: 
622, 629). 
                                                                                                                                                        
4. See Alvarez, et al. (2008) and Lehoucq (2003) on general definitions of electoral fraud. 
See Schaffer (2007) for a comprehensive examination of vote buying in practice. 
5. See Hasen (2000), Karlan (1994), Nichter (2008) and Panagopoulos (2013). 
6. I do not argue that bribery and electoral fraud are the same; nor do I argue that electoral 
fraud and tax- cut promises are the same. Instead, the argument is that there is much shared in 
common. The following sections dissect important differences and their potential bearing on 
the relation between electoral fraud and tax- cut promises. 
7. I am most grateful to a referee for this journal for highlighting the importance of this 
distinction to clarify how manipulation can be understood as wrongful. 
8. This understanding of electoral fraud is wider than Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s focus on 
vote buying. Lippert-Rasmussen agrees on conditions (a) and (b), but he further stipulates 
further conditions such as that the costs will be borne by private individuals and that the 
benefits related to vote buying will be targeted primarily to individual vote sellers (2011: 
127–-8). While I agree with much of his analysis, my understanding is sufficiently wide to 
include these cases and other cases where the promises used to manipulate voting behaviour 
where costs are borne by entities other than private individuals and with greater attention to 
non-monetary forms, such as campaign promises in general (although Lippert-Rasmussen 
does consider non-monetary benefits, too) (see 2011: 129). 
9. It might be objected that promises are not contractual obligations and savvy voters should 
be able to recognisze them as such. But this is not always true. In many Western democracies, 
political parties contest elections on campaign manifestos which are their stated political 
commitments for government if elected. Campaign promises may be binding on parties in 
this way in addition to voters and the press holding an election’s winners to account for the 
campaign promises made that helped secure their election to office. 
                                                                                                                                                        
10. We may draw a distinction between two forms of campaign promises: I will argue in 
section V that tax- cut promises are a(n uncontroversial) form of campaign promises. The 
first is global whereby global campaign promises are offered to the electorate as a whole. The 
second form is individual whereby campaign promises are offered to individuals, such as 
individual persons or corporations. It might be argued that tax- cut promises can be directed 
towards supporters only. For example, a candidate for office can promise a tax cut to a 
particular business if it sets up a factory in my constituency. In response, I would argue that 
such promises are relatively rare: most promises to cut taxes are global promises. Moreover, 
tax- cut promises that are individual, not global, remain less certain and more conditional 
(and no less problematic) than vote buying for the aforementioned reasons above. However, 
such tax- cut promises to individuals are one further possibility whereby vote buying and tax- 
cut promises share deep similarities. For my purposes, our focus will remain on the more 
common case of (global) tax- cut promises.  
11. This highlights a contingent, rather than necessary, difference between vote buying and 
tax- cut promises. 
12. I am very grateful to a referee for this journal for drawing my attention to this distinction. 
13. This is a contingent difference because vote buying might take the form of a public 
promise were it not illegal. I would argue that this difference retains importance insofar as 
vote buying is illegal and unlikely to gain explicit public support politically or legally while 
campaign promises to cut taxes possess this support and legality. 
14. These promises are best understood as attempts because their effects are uncertain. If 
every voter made electoral choices in light of his or her individual monetary interest alone, 
then tax- cut promises for all would win 100 per cent% support. However, this is not the 
reality as voters make choices for a plurality of reasons. Such promises are attempts to 
manipulate and not guarantees (Medearis 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                        
15. An additional potential difference concerns incentives. It might be argued that a tax- cut 
promise does not offer individual voters an incentive to vote for the candidate. This is 
because the likely benefit of individuals receiving the benefit of a tax cut may be largely 
unaffected by whether or not the individual votes for the candidate offering the tax cut. The 
incentive for individuals might appear to be different with cases of vote buying because the 
reward is distributed to individuals in advance of elections, but this difference is illusory. 
Individuals have no more incentive to vote for a candidate offering a tax cut than another 
offering to buy their votes. This is because either reward can be received without the 
individual, in fact, voting for the candidate. 
16. Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the ‘essential distinction’ is that a campaign promise is a 
promise and vote buying is contractual. He says: ‘A contract obliges both parties to act in 
certain ways. A promise only obliges the promising party to act in a certain way’, but without 
obligation (2011: 130). I am unconvinced that there is a clear distinction to be drawn. The 
idea appears to be that contracts place obligations on all parties and promises are one-sided, 
but this is not always true. If we agree that I will pick you up tomorrow afternoon, then the 
obligations – and expectations – of you and I seem little different where our agreement is the 
basis for some kind of contract or promise. You will expect me to make good on my 
obligation to you irrespective of whether my act is contracted or promised. Likewise, you will 
become disappointed either way if I failed to make good on my obligation (Eisenberg 2001: 
225n39 (‘the law of contract is for the most part the law of promises’)). 
17. Lippert-Rasmussen notes that ‘it is hard to see the relevant substantial difference between 
vote buying and election promises’ (2011: 135). 
18. This argument relates to the view that vote buying should be banned because it would 
otherwise undermine democracy: ‘the legitimacy of the political process rests on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
prohibition of such transactions’, such as ‘voluntary transactions in votes’ (Satz 2010: 34, see 
96, 102–-3). 
19. Lippert-Rasmussen considers different objections to vote buying relating to inequality, 
such as the ‘equality of political impact’, ‘identical opportunities for political influence’, 
‘equally good opportunities for political influence’ and ‘equality of interest satisfaction’. 
(2011: 138–-43). He raises illuminating insights into the problems many of these objections 
run into. For example, the objection to vote buying that it denies the equal impact of each 
vote on political outcomes fails to recognisze ‘that it is conceptually possible for a group to 
have a political impact in a way that does not promote its members’ interests’ (2011: 139). Or 
the concern that citizens ought to have identical opportunities for political influence may not 
be undermined by vote buying if we consider that political influence may be exercised in 
more ways than at the ballot box (2011: 140). Part of his analysis is meant to show that if we 
want to reject vote buying we might commit ourselves ‘on pain of inconsistency’ to ‘reject 
inequality-producing election promises’ (2011: 143). My argument is that this inconsistency 
can be avoided because of problems about the enforceability of any such ban on election 
promises and not their relative wrongfulness. 
20. Perhaps one – possibly controversial – example includes the promises to enact a flat tax. 
Some proponents argue that the flat tax need not benefit the wealthy at the expense of the 
least well off, but that it is likely a flat tax would benefit the wealthy and least well off at the 
expense of the middle class (see Davies and Hoy 2002; Paulus and Peichi 2009). There is 
further evidence that a flat tax would not improve efficiency either (see Weisbach 2000). 
21. Recall the earlier distinction made between two voters – similarly situated in all relevant 
respects – where one is motived by pre-existing considerations, like ideological commitments, 
and the other motivated purely by the desire to receive a cash reward for his or her vote. The 
inalienability of my vote is abrogated where I am like that second voter: I perceive a 
                                                                                                                                                        
campaign promise as offering cash for my vote and I act accordingly without regard to other 
factors. 
22. Freiman (2014) argues that a reasonable case for legalising vote buying and selling can be 
made, in part, if we recognisze the close kinship between campaign promises such as pledges 
to cut taxes and vote buying. This claim is not meant to be a compelling argument in favour 
of vote buying, but part of an attempt that a reasonable case can be made. Freiman’s 
argument further rests on the idea that if citizens are permitted to vote however they choose, 
then they should be permitted to sell their votes however they choose. This claim assumes 
that the ability to make a political choice should entail an ability to permit others to 
manipulate or exercise their own choices through a voter: they do not and so I find his case 
unconvincing however novel. 
23. To clarify: it is not my claim that all forms of non-manipulative perversions of the 
political process are justifiable. 
24. This argument about scope relates to the idea of votes as public (and purely individual) 
goods (see Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon 1999). But note that this idea of votes as ‘public’ is 
insufficient to distinguish between permissible campaign promises and wrongful vote buying. 
This is because it might be possible for a sufficiently wealthy candidate to attempt to buy the 
votes of all and so both campaign promises and vote buying could be similarly inclusive in 
theory.  
25. The fact that some action (or perhaps omission) may be wrongful may be insufficient to 
secure illegality. Criminaliszation often requires however imperfectly the satisfaction of some 
threshold so that only sufficiently serious public wrongs might merit potential liability under 
the criminal law (see Brooks 2012: 1—–11).  
26. While voting will take place in secret, vote buying may be discoverable through any 
records of agreements made and benefits distributed in return for votes. 
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27. Note that my position does not rest on an endorsement of Rousseau’s philosophical 
arguments, such as his theory of the general will. 
28. It may appear very controversial to argue we should ban self-interested voting even if it 
were feasible. But my argument is that it is not even if it remains wrongful. Perhaps it is 
similarly controversial to argue that voting should not be determined by which candidates in 
an election offer the most cash to voters in return for their votes. It could be argued that 
voters should be permitted to choose whoever they like. But to say that cash rewards alone 
can or should be permissible runs very close to arguing electoral bribery is acceptable so long 
as eligible voters consent to it – and a position most democratic theorists would likely reject. 
29. See Lopez-Guerra (2014: 76): ‘This is exactly what happens in cases of vote buying. 
While it is impossible to identify and nullify the corrupt ballots, the persons involved could 
be sanctioned . . . However, the most effective and costless way to prevent instruction would 
be simply to disenfranchise those who have the instruction handicap’. 
30. Acknowledgement [redacted]. I must also thank two referees for this journal who each 
provided constructive and insightful comments that greatly benefited this piece. 
